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Locke and Leibniz on Freedom and Necessity 
Idan Shimony (Tel Aviv)/Yekutiel Shoham (Tel Aviv) 
δocke and δeibniz are often classified as proponents of compatibilist theories 
of human freedom, since both maintain that freedom is consistent with deter-
minism and that the difference between being and not being free turns on how 
one is determined.1 However, we will argue in this paper that their versions of 
compatibilism are essentially different and that they have significantly distinct 
commitments to compatibilism. To this end, we will first analyze the defini-
tions and examples for freedom and necessity that δocke and δeibniz present 
in sections κ–1γ of chapter β1 of the Essay on Human Understanding and the 
Nouveaux essais respectively,β and then conjecture how δocke and δeibniz 
would have continued the discussion, if they had had the opportunity to en-
gage in an exchange of opinions. In this way, we believe, one will be in a 
position to understand why δeibniz thinks that δocke’s discussion of freedom 
“est un des plus prolixes et des plus subtils de son ouvrage.”γ
1 See Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett’s introduction to their translation of the Nouveaux 
essaisμ Gottfried Wilhelm δeibnizμ New Essays on Human Understanding, transl. by Peter 
Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge 1λλ6 [hereafter σE], pp. xxii–xxiii. See also Vere 
Chappellμ “δocke on the Freedom of the Will,” inμ Id. (ed.)μ Locke, τxford 1λλκ, pp. κ6–10η, 
here p. κλ; σicholas Jolleyμ Locke. His Philosophical Thought, τxford 1λλλ, pp. 1βκ–1γ0. 
β δocke’s chapter and δeibniz’s corresponding chapter are the longest chapters of the Essay 
and the Nouveaux essais, respectively. It is thus impossible to provide here a complete account 
of these chapters. References to δocke’s Essay are to book, chapter, and section numbers in 
John δockeμ An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. by P. H. σidditch, τxford 1λιη 
[hereafter E]. 
γ “δetter to Isaac Jacquelot, βκ. April 1ι0ζ”, GP III, ζιγ. In addition to the standard abbrevia-
tions for Gerhardt’s (GP) and the Academy’s (A) editions of δeibniz’s texts, we use the follow-
ing abbreviationsμ AG = Gottfried Wilhelm δeibnizμ Philosophical Essays, ed. and transl. by 
Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Indianapolis 1λκλ; CJδ = The Correspondence of John Locke, 
κ vols., ed. by E. S. de Beer, τxford 1λι6–1λκλ; H = Gottfried Wilhelm δeibnizμ Theodicy, 
transl. by E. ε. Huggard and ed. by Austin Farrer, δondon 1λη1; δ = Id.μ Philosophical Papers 
and Letters, transl. and ed. by δeroy E. δoemker, Dordrecht β1λ6λ; δA = Id./Antoine Arnauldμ 
The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence, ed. and transl. by H. T. εason, εanchester 1λ6ι; δang-
ley = Gottfried Wilhelm δeibnizμ New Essays concerning Human Understanding, transl. by A. 
G. δangley, δondon 1κλ6; δC = Id./Simon Clarkeμ The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, ed. by
H. G. Alexander, εanchester 1λη6; Pδ = Gottfried Wilhelm δeibnizμ Logical Papers, ed. and
transl. by G. H. R. Parkinson, τxford 1λ66; PP = Id.μ Philosophical Writings, ed. by G. H. R.
Parkinson, δondon 1λιγ.
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1. Locke on Freedom and Necessity
δocke discusses freedom and necessity in chapter β1 of book β of his Essay, 
entitled “of power.” According to δocke, the idea of power is a simple idea, 
which we receive from sensation and reflection.ζ δocke opens chapter β1 by 
explaining how we get this ideaμ we observe patterns of change inside and 
outside us and conclude that certain things have the possibility or power to 
generate certain changes in other things.η That which generates change is ac-
tive power, and that which is capable of receiving change is passive power.6 
Corporeal objects mainly give us examples of passive power through their 
motion, while we experience active power by means of the thinking of our 
mind.ι σext, δocke claims that will and understanding are active powers of 
the mind or the agent.κ Will is the power of the agent to choose or determine 
a preferred course of action.λ The understanding is the power of the agent to 
think or perceive. δocke does not object to calling will and understanding fac-
ulties of the mind, as long as one uses the term properly, that is, as indicating 
powers of the agent, and not as referring to independent agents working in 
some kind of autonomy within the mind.10 δocke implies here that only agents 
are the possessors of powers, so that one power cannot belong to another.11 In 
ζ E II, ι, κ. 
η Ibid., β1, 1. 
6 Ibid., β. 
ι Ibid., ζ. Each power has a relation to a certain action and there are only two sorts of actions 
of which we have ideas, namely, thinking and motion. εotion is related to bodies and, δocke 
maintains, it is more of a passion than an action. Therefore, corporeal objects provide us with 
examples of passive power. Thinking is naturally related to the mind and it is through intro-
spection that we see that we can actively initiate movements of our body merely by willing it 
or thinking about it. Hence, the mind gives us the idea of active power. 
κ Ibid., η. 
λ Volition or willing is the actual exercise of the will, namely, a determination of a preferred 
course of action. An action determined in this way is voluntary, while an action performed 
without such deliberation is involuntary.  
10 Ibid., 6. 
11 Cf. Ibid., 16–1λ. 
 
δocke and δeibniz on Freedom and σecessity ηιη 
particular, freedom, as a power, cannot be ascribed to the will itself but only 
to the agent.1β 
After remarking briefly that we receive the ideas of freedom and neces-
sity by observing the power in us to begin, avoid, continue, or end actions,1γ 
δocke turns to define these ideas. 
“[…] the idea of liberty is […] the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear 
any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, 
whereby either of them is preferred to the other; where either of them is not in 
the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he 
is not at liberty, that agent is under necessity. So that liberty cannot be, where 
there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be 
will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty.”1ζ 
At first sight, the definitions of will and freedom seem so close, that one might 
wonder why δocke distinguishes them as two separate powers of the mind.1η 
But there is a difference between them. Will is the power of the agent to prefer 
or choose a course of action, while freedom is the power of the agent to realize 
her choices and preferences.16 Will, then, is a necessary condition of freedom, 
and freedom may be taken as the power of the agent to do what she wills.1ι 
δocke’s definition emphasizes that thinking is another necessary con-
dition of freedom. By thinking δocke seems to mean here reasoning or rational 
deliberation, by means of which the preference is determined. Hence, thinking 
is only indirectly a necessary condition of freedomμ it is a necessary condition 
for willing, which, in turn, is a necessary condition of freedom. The example 
1β Ibid., 1ζ. δocke goes from claiming that it is unintelligible and meaningless to ask whether 
the will is free (ibid.), to argue for determinism of the will (ibid., ββ–βη). τn this point, see 
Chappellμ “δocke on the Freedom”, p. λβ–λ6.  
1γ E II, β1, ι. 
1ζ Ibid., κ. 
1η See D. J. τ’Connorμ John Locke, σew York 1λ6ι, p. 11η. 
16 See John Yoltonμ A Locke Dictionary, τxford 1λλγ, p. 1βλ; τ’Connorμ John Locke, p. 11η. 
1ι Seeμ “δiberty […] is the power a εan has to do or forbear doing any particular action, ac-
cording as its doing or forbearance has the actual preference in the mind, which is the same 
thing as to say, according as he himself wills it” (E II, β1, 1η). Jolley elucidates the point as 
followsμ “Freedom is, roughly, the power to do what we will, and will in turn is the power to 
choose one course of action over another from the alternatives which are physically possible 
for us” (Jolleyμ Locke, p. 1βη). 
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of the tennis ball1κ confirms this reading. A tennis ball does not think. Conse-
quently, it has no volition and, therefore, it is not a free agent. 
δocke’s subsequent examples stress that thinking and willing are not 
sufficient for freedom. A man falling from a bridge breaking underneath him 
certainly thinks that it is better not to fall and prefers or wills not to fall. Yet, 
he is not free, since it is not in his power to prevent his fall (E β.β1.λ). Consider 
further the case of a second man, carried in his sleep into a locked room, where 
a person he is glad to meet is found. He wakes up and enjoys the company. 
He willingly stays in the room, that is, he prefers staying over leaving the 
room. His staying is voluntary, yet he is not free, since it is not in his power 
to leave, if he preferred to do so.1λ “Voluntary then is not opposed to neces-
sary, but to involuntary,”β0 and furthermore, voluntary is not identical to free.β1 
These two examples reveal another essential component of freedom ac-
cording to δocke, namely, being able to do otherwise, or as δocke calls it, the 
equal ability to perform or avoid an actionββ or indifference of ability.βγ The 
falling man is not free because he has no choice but to fall. Similarly, the 
second man may will to stay in the room with his good friend but he too is not 
free, since he has no choiceμ whether or not he wants to stay, he cannot leave 
the locked room. The absence of compulsion or restraint, both external and 
internal, is vital for freedom. 
To sum up, δocke’s definition of freedom contains three essential ele-
mentsμ thinking, will, and indifference of ability. Whenever at least one of 
these elements is missing, there is a state of necessity. A being with no under-
standing has no will and, therefore, is never free. Such beings are called “nec-
essary agents”βζ. τn the other hand, a rational agent is free if all three condi-
tions of freedom are satisfied and in a state of necessity if not. In particular, a 
rational agent is under necessity even when she does what she wills, if she is 
not able to do otherwise, that is, if the third condition of indifference of ability 
is not satisfied. Finally, understanding, will, and freedom are powers of the 
agent and thus may be ascribed only to the agent and not to other powers. We 
1κ E II, β1, λ. 
1λ Ibid., 10. 
β0 Ibid., 11. 
β1 The examples discussed above are examples of external actions or “motions of the body”. 
δocke remarks in section 1β that there is complete correspondence between external and mental 
actions in this context of freedom and necessity. 
ββ Ibid., κ. 
βγ Ibid., 10. 
βζ Ibid., κ; 1γ. 
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may say that an agent has an understanding, that she wills something, or that 
she is free. But it is meaningless to say that freedom thinks, that the under-
standing wills something, or that the will is free. 
2. Leibniz on Freedom and Necessity
In his corresponding chapter, δeibniz omits discussions regarding the source 
of the relevant ideas and turns directly to considering their content. δeibniz 
has already stated his general disagreement with δocke about the origin and 
nature of ideas, so there is no point to repeat it here.βη  
Regarding will,β6 δeibniz does not follow δocke’s lead in defining it as 
the power to set a preference, but rather renders willing or volition as the  
“effort or endeavor (conatus) to move towards what one finds good and away 
from what one finds bad, the endeavor arising immediately out of one’s aware-
ness of those things.”βι  
βη In the second book of the Essay δocke argues that our tabula rasa mind receives all its ideas 
from experience through sensation and reflection. δeibniz has expressed his dissatisfaction con-
cerning this point ever since his first reflections on the Essay from the mid 16λ0s (see “τn 
δocke’s Essay on Human Understanding”; GP V, 1η f. / δangley, 1ζ–16; and “Specimen of 
Thoughts upon the Second Book”; GP V, βγ / δangley, βγ f. Cf. “δeibniz’s review of Pierre 
Coste’s French translation of δocke’s Essay”; GP V, γι / δangley, γκ. He elaborates on it in 
the preface to the Nouveaux Essais; A VI, 6, ζι–ηγ. The crucial point here is that the term 
“idea” denotes something different for δocke and for δeibniz. δocke conceives it as a mental 
item actually present in the mind when one perceives and thinks, while for δeibniz it is a pre-
requisite, as it were, for coherent thinking (see “What is an Idea”; A VI, ζ, 1γι0f. / δ, β0ι f.; 
“εeditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas”, A VI, ζ, ηκκ ff. / δ, βλβ f.). Accordingly, δeib-
niz asserts at the beginning of book βμ “In order to keep away from an argument upon which 
we have already spent too long, let me say in advance, sir, that when you say that ideas come 
from one or other of those causes [i.e. sensation or reflection], I shall take that to mean the 
actual perception of the ideas; for I believe I have shown that in so far as they contain something 
distinct they are in us before we are aware of them” (σE II, 1, β). 
β6 We omit here δeibniz’s reply concerning the idea of power, since it is less relevant to the general 
line of argument. In brief, δeibniz regards power as possibility of change, distinguishes between 
active and passive power, and agrees with δocke that the mind gives us the clearest idea of active 
power while matter provides examples of passive power (σE II, β1, 1–ζ). 
βι Ibid., η. 
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Both our inner and outer actions follow from this endeavor, as long as it is not 
hindered. δeibniz contrasts volition with appetition. The latter is an effort or 
endeavor arising from insensible perceptions, of which we are unaware.βκ Vol-
untary, by contrast, may be ascribed only to “actions one can be aware of and 
can reflect upon when they arise from some consideration of good and bad.”βλ 
Finally, understanding is not merely the power to perceive, but rather a power 
to actually understand what we perceive, form distinct idea of it, and reflect 
on it.γ0 
In response to δocke’s definition of freedom, δeibniz presents a series 
of distinctions.γ1 Freedom is either freedom in law or in fact. The examples of 
cases of freedom in law imply that this type of freedom is a right granted to 
human beings in social and political contexts. Freedom in fact refers to the 
state or ability of the person herself, irrespective of the political context.γβ 
Freedom in fact is further distinguished into freedom to act (i.e. freedom to do 
what one wills) and freedom to will (i.e. the power to will as one should).γγ 
δeibniz classifies δocke’s freedom as a freedom of action. He remarks briefly 
that a person is free in this sense if she has the required means and suitable 
control over her body. 
βκ δeibniz adds that there are appetitions of which we can be aware, but does not elaborate on 
this point. The notion of “minute perceptions”, namely insensible perceptions of which we are 
unaware, stems from the principle of continuity. If one’s mind could be said to be without per-
ceptions during dreamless sleep, and then all of a sudden in possession of perceptions as one 
wakes up, the principle of continuity would be violated. Hence, one must concede that “notice-
able perceptions arise by degrees from ones which are too minute to be noticed” (σE, “Preface”; 
A VI, 6, ηγ–ηι). 
βλ σE II, β1, η. 
γ0 The difference between δocke and δeibniz on this point corresponds to their different con-
ceptions of what idea is (see note 11 above). 
γ1 σE II, β1, κ. See Appendix 1 below. 
γβ If we think of freedom in law in terms of social or political right, than freedom in fact may 
be taken as natural right.  
γγ δeibniz agrees with δocke that one cannot properly speak of freedom of will, since freedom 
may be attributed to agents and not to the agent’s powers or faculties. Thus, the customary 
phrase “freedom of will” has to be understood as meaning “freedom of the agent to will”, and 
when asking whether the will is free “the intention is to ask whether a man is free when he 
wills” (ibid., 1ζ). In general, δeibniz concurs that it is inappropriate to regard the faculties of 
the mind as active agents in themselves (ibid., 6).  
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δeibniz seems more interested in the second type of freedom in fact, 
namely, freedom to will or the power to will as one should. This type is further 
distinguished into two subtypes. The one is contrasted with the imperfection 
of the mind and pertains to the understanding. It involves the ability to restrain 
the influence of the passions on the will by means of the understanding. The 
second is contrasted with necessity and pertains to the willμ 
“[…] it consists in the view that the strongest reasons or impressions which the 
understanding presents to the will do not prevent the act of the will from being 
contingent, and do not confer upon it an absolute or (so to speak) metaphysical 
necessity. It is in this sense that I always say that the understanding can determine 
the will, in accordance with which perceptions and reasons prevail, in a manner 
which, although it is certain and infallible, inclines without necessitating.”γζ 
This type of freedom consists in determining the will through the understand-
ing and contains three essential componentsμ spontaneity, intelligence or ra-
tional deliberation, and contingency. Spontaneity means self-determination. A 
free agent consciously determines her will and actively influences her course 
of action. Second, δeibniz agrees with δocke that intelligence is a necessary 
condition of freedom and maintains that a free agent determines her will by 
means of her understanding.γη Finally, δeibniz contends that determining the 
will by reasons provided by the understanding does not undermine freedom, 
since it involves contingency rather than necessity.  
The notions of “contingency” and “incline without necessitating” re-
quire further explication. σecessary is something the opposite of which is log-
ically impossible, and contingent is something the opposite of which is logi-
cally possible.γ6 δocke defines necessity as lack of freedom. Hence, for exam-
ple, on δocke’s account the motion of a tennis ball is necessary, since it is not 
γζ Ibid., κ. 
γη Seeμ “Aristotle has rightly noted that we are not prepared to call an action “free” unless as 
well as being spontaneous [spontanées] it is also deliberate [deliberées]” (ibid., λ). Remnant 
and Bennett translate here “unconstrained” rather than “spontaneous”, which seems more suit-
able to the immediate context (discussing the unconstrained motion of a tennis ball). δangley, 
on the other hand, retains the word “spontaneous”, which fits better with the broader context of 
δeibniz’s discussion of freedom. 
γ6 Seeμ “A truth is necessary when its opposite implies contradiction; and when it is not neces-
sary, it is called contingent” (“δetter to Coste, 1λ December 1ι0ι”; GP III, ζ00 / AG, 1λγ); 
“[…] event whose opposite is possible is contingent, event as that whose opposite is impossible 
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free. For δeibniz, on the other hand, although the motion of the tennis ball is 
not free, it is not necessary but rather contingent. That the ball moves in a 
certain way is not a logically necessary truth. It is rather a truth that depends 
on certain circumstances and the laws of nature in force. Thus, the motion of 
the tennis ball involves merely conditional or hypothetical necessityμ if the 
laws of nature were different, it would move in a different manner. Therefore, 
the opposite case (i.e. other motion) is possible and not contradictory. In the 
case of a free rational agent, the fact that she determines her will through her 
understanding does not eliminate her freedom, since the determination does 
not involve absolute or logical necessity.γι This is so, since the inclination of 
the will toward a certain option does not cancel the other options, that is, the 
alternative options do not become contradictory but remain possible. A wise 
agent choosing an optimal course of action on the basis of intelligent grounds 
provided by the understanding is not under necessity, since although not cho-
sen, inferior alternative ways are still logically possible and are not cancelled 
by the choice. 
“But good, either true or apparent – in a word, the motive – inclines without 
necessitating, that is, without imposing an absolute necessity. For when God 
is necessary” (“Theodicy”, § βκβ; GP VI, βκζ / H, βλλ); “[…] we must distinguish between an 
absolute and a hypothetical necessity. We must also distinguish between a necessity which takes 
place because the opposite implies a contradiction (which necessity is called logical, metaphys-
ical, or mathematical) and a necessity which is moral, whereby a wise being chooses the best, 
and every mind follows the strongest inclination” (“δeibniz’s ηth δetter to Clarke”, § ζ; δC, 
η6). 
γι Rational agents do not, of course, always act freely. Their will is not determined merely by 
reasons, but also by dispositions, passions, habits, beliefs, and external impressions (“ηth δetter 
to Clarke”, § 1η / δC, ηλ. “δetter on Freedom”; PP, 11γ). They are free to the extent that they 
take into consideration all these types of motives in order to actively determine their will in a 
certain way. Willing as one should means being able to satisfactorily take into consideration or 
weigh all relevant motives. In so far as the will is passively determined by passions and impres-
sions, the agent’s action is not free. To this δeibniz refers when he talks about freedom to will 
as contrasted with the imperfection of the mind (σE II, β1, κ). τn δeibniz’s image of weighing 
motives on the scales of the balance of reason, see εarcelo Dascalμ “The Balance of Reason”, 
inμ Daniel Vanderveken (ed.)μ Logic, Thought and Action, Dordrecht β00η, pp. βι–ζι. Charlie 
Dunbar Broadμ Leibniz. An Introduction, δondon 1λιη, p. γ0) maintains that “incline without 
necessitating” means that the reasons do not demonstratively entail the conclusion, but merely 
give it a probability greater than one-half. 
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(for instance) chooses the best, what he does not choose, and is inferior in per-
fection, is nevertheless possible. But if what he chooses was absolutely neces-
sary, any other way would be impossible, which is against the hypothesis. For 
God chooses among possibles, that is, among many ways none of which implies 
a contradiction.”γκ  
The distinction between necessary and contingent is crucial for δeibniz, since 
it is what makes place for freedom in his system. According to δeibniz’s prin-
ciple of sufficient reason, there is no indifference and everything in the world 
is determined. So if determined meant necessary, there could be no freedom. 
Thus, he distinguishes between being necessarily determined and being con-
tingently determined. 
“[…] determination should not be confused with necessityμ there is just as much 
connection or determination amongst thoughts as amongst motions (since being 
determined is not at all the same as being forced or pushed in a constraining 
way)[…] If by ‘necessity’ we understood a man’s being inevitably determined, 
as could be foreseen by a perfect εind provided with a complete knowledge of 
everything going on outside and inside that man, then, since thoughts are as 
determined as the movements which they represent, it is certain that every free 
act would be necessary; but we must distinguish what is necessary from what 
is contingent though determined. σot only are contingent truths not necessary, 
but the links between them are not always absolutely necessary either; for it 
must be admitted that when one thing follows from another in the contingent 
realm, the kind of determining that is involved is not the same as when one 
thing follows from another in the realm of the necessary. Geometrical and met-
aphysical ‘followings’ necessitate, but physical and moral ones incline without 
necessitating. There is even a moral and voluntary element in what is physical, 
through its relation to God, since the laws of motion are necessitated only by 
what is best. God chooses freely, even though he is determined to choose the 
best. But since bodies do not choose for themselves, God having chosen for 
them, they have come to be called ‘necessary agents’ in common usage. I have 
no objection to this, provided that no one confounds the necessary with the de-
termined and goes on to suppose that free beings act in an undetermined way – 
an error which has prevailed in certain minds, and destroys the most important 
truths, even the fundamental axiom that nothing happens without reason.”γλ  
γκ “ηth δetter to Clarke”, § κ; δC, ηι. 
γλ σE II, β1, 1γ. 
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To sum up, unlike δocke, who emphasizes freedom of action, δeibniz is in-
terested in freedom to will (i.e. the ability to will as one should), and in par-
ticular, in freedom to will as contrasted with necessity. This type of freedom 
involves three essential componentsμ spontaneity, rational deliberation, and 
contingency. The latter is in particular vital for δeibniz, since he allows no 
indifference and, therefore, must admit a type of determination which is not 
necessary.ζ0 
3. A Hypothetical Continuation of the Discussion
A hypothetical continuation of the discussion between δocke and δeibniz on 
freedom and necessity may facilitate a deeper understanding of their positions 
and differences. τf course, the subject is rich with intricate ideas and subtle-
ties, and discussing them here in full detail is impossible. We will thus focus 
merely on the determination of the will by the understanding and the ability 
to do otherwise.  
First, it appears that δocke and δeibniz would have acknowledged ra-
ther quickly their different emphases. δocke is interested in a type of freedom 
which can ground moral responsibility and just divine providence, so he em-
phasizes freedom to act or the ability to do otherwise.ζ1 δeibniz does not dis-
agree but simply thinks that it is a brute fact or an “axiom” that when an agent 
wills something and is not hindered, she will act accordingly.ζβ Hence he 
thinks that the problem of willing as one should is more significant to under-
standing freedom. 
ζ0 Seeμ “I have shown that freedom […] consists in intelligence, which involves a clear 
knowledge of the object of deliberation, in spontaneity, whereby we determine, and in contin-
gency, that is, in the exclusion of logical or metaphysical necessity. Intelligence is, as it were, 
the soul of freedom, and the rest is as its body and foundation. The free substance is self-deter-
mining and that according to the motive of good perceived by the understanding, which inclines 
it without compelling itμ and all the conditions of freedom are comprised in these few words” 
(“Theodicy”, § βκκ; GP VI, βκκ / H, γ0γ). 
ζ1 See e.g. E IV, 1ι, ζ. 
ζβ σE II, β1, η. 
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In this regard too, δocke and δeibniz may seem to agree, at least ini-
tially. For whereas δocke stresses indifference of ability, he rejects indiffer-
ence of will and maintains, in a similar manner to δeibniz, that 
“‘tis as much a perfection, that desire, or the power of preferring should be 
determined by Good, as that the power of acting should be determined by the 
will, and the certainer such determination is, the greater is the perfection. σay, 
were we determined by anything but the last result of our own minds, judging 
of the good or evil of any action, we were not free, the very end of our freedom 
being, that we might attain the good we choose. And therefore every man is put 
under a necessity by his constitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined 
in willing by his own thought and judgment, what is best for him to doμ else he 
would be under the determination of some other than himself, which is want of 
liberty.”ζγ 
To this Theophilus concisely replies on δeibniz’s behalf that  
“σothing could be more true; those who seek some other kind of freedom do 
not know what they are asking for.”ζζ  
It is this agreement which led scholars to conclude that δocke and δeibniz 
share a compatibilist view regarding freedom. But again, conjecturing how a 
discussion between the two would have proceeded may draw our attention to 
substantial differences between their compatibilist positions. We may assume 
that their discussion would not have stopped at this point of agreement, but 
continued to the fundamental principles underlying the idea of the determina-
tion of the will.  
δeibniz’s answer is straightforward. As quoted above, the determina-
tion of the will follows from and genuine indifference is ruled out by δeibniz’s 
principle of sufficient reason. δeibniz concedes that in a certain sense freedom 
may be said to involve indifference. But this indifference merely means the 
exclusion of logical and physical necessity. That is, it consists in (1) contin-
gency or choice between logically possible alternatives and in (β) the fact that 
an agent is not necessitated by physical (and psychological) laws to choose 
one way or another (unlike, e.g., heavy things which are bound by physical 
ζγ E II, β1, ζκ. 
ζζ σE II, β1, ζκ. 
 
ηκζ Idan Shimony/Yekutiel Shoham
laws to tend downward). In this restricted sense, freedom may be said to in-
clude indifference of ability.ζη But freedom does not involve indifference of 
equilibrium, namely, an indifference according to which the agent equally in-
clines toward competing alternatives. σor does it include some sort of “indif-
ferentistic power” to determine oneself to act without grounds or even against 
all grounds.ζ6 
δocke, on the other hand, seems to lack a metaphysical underpinning 
of the determination of the will by the understanding. Perhaps it is this defi-
ciency that accounts for his claim in §ζι that one can suspend judgment, 
namely, suspend the determination of the will toward a certain end, which is 
contrary to his general view that an agent is never free not to will one way or 
another.ζι This may also explain δocke’s concession to Philippus van δim-
borch, who challenged δocke’s view regarding the determination of the will. 
If δocke and δeibniz had engaged in exchange of ideas on the matter, δeibniz 
would have probably drawn δocke’s attention to the inconsistency in § ζιζκ 
and may have been instrumental in facing van δimborch’s challenge. Van 
δimborch writes to δocke that indifference is necessary for freedomμ 
“σow my opinion is that when a man acts in accordance with right reason he 
always wills what his understanding judges ought to be done; nevertheless he 
can also act against reason and determine his will to the contrary; more than 
thatμ before his understanding, after a careful examination of the reasons, has 
judged what ought to be done he can by brute impulse do, not what is in accord-
ance with reason, but what carnal desire dictates. If a man does not have liberty 
ζη See David Blumenfeldμ “Freedom, Contingency, and Things Possible in Themselve”, inμ 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research ζλ/1 (1λκκ), p. κ1–101, here κβ–κγ. 
ζ6 See “Discourse on εetaphysics”, § γ0; A VI, ζ, 1ηιη / δ, γβ1 f.; “δetter to Arnauld, 1ζ July 
16κ6”; A II, β, κ0 / δ, γγι; “σecessary and Contingent Truths”; A VI, ζ, 1ηβ0–1ηβ1 / PP, 101 
f.; “δetter on Freedom”, PP, 11γ f.; “τn the Radical τrigination of Things”, GP, VII γ0ζ; δ, 
ζκκ; σE, II, β1, βη; γ6; ζι; “δetter to Coste, 1λ December 1ι0ι”, GP III, ζ01 f.; AG, 1λζ f.;
“Theodicy”, § ζ6; GP VI, 1βκ / H, 1ζκ f.; “δeibniz’s ηth δetter to Clarke”, §§16–1ι; δC, ηλ f. 
ζι See E II, β1, βγ. 
ζκ δeibniz probably would have also questioned δocke’s comment in E IV, γ, βλ to the effect 
that the laws of nature are to be ascribed to “the arbitrary will and good pleasure of the wise 
architect,” which implies that God’s freedom does involve indifference of will. 
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herein to determine himself or not to determine himself, and to suspend his ac-
tion, I cannot see in what liberty consists.”ζλ 
In the beginning of the correspondence δocke stands his ground. He rejects 
van δimborch’s claim and maintains that  
“δiberty in no wise consists in the indifferency of a man, but only in the power 
to act or not to act according as we will.”η0 
But in his subsequent letter van δimborch persists and explains that indiffer-
ence does not mean that an agent is equally inclined toward different alterna-
tives, for such equilibrium, especially with regard to moral actions, does not 
exist. It rather means that despite an inclination to one side, an agent can de-
termine herself to the other, and this demonstrates her “dominion” over her 
actions and hence her freedom.η1 Van δimborch argues that δocke’s definition 
of freedom is too narrow, since it refers only to action but not to willing.ηβ In 
a way, van δimborch stresses a similar point to that raised by δeibnizμ that 
action must not be hindered is rather trivial; more important is the role of will-
ing in free actions. δocke appears to eventually come round to van δimborch’s 
positionμηγ 
“[…] in my opinion a man is free in every action, as well of willing as of un-
derstanding, if he was able to have abstained from that action of willing or un-
derstanding; if not, not. εore particularly, as regards the willμ there are some 
cases in which a man is unable not to will, and in all those acts of willing a man 
is not free because he is unable not to act. In the rest, where he was able to will 
or not to will, he is free.”ηζ  
ζλ “κ July 1ι01”, CJδ VII, γ6λ f. See also from the same letterμ “Indifferency is that energy of 
the spirit by which, when all requisites for acting are present, it can act or not act” (ibid., γ6ι). 
Cf. “δetter of γ τctober 1ι01”, ibid., ζηγ. 
η0 “1β August 1ι01”, ibid., ζ0λ; cf. “δetter of β1 εay 1ι01”, ibid., γβκ f. 
η1 “γ τctober 1ι01”, ibid., ζηη. 
ηβ Ibid., ζηκ f. 
ηγ Chappell (“δocke on the Freedom of the Will,” p. 10β f.) takes it as evidence that the addition 
to §η6 in the postmortem fifth edition of the Essay is a consequence of δocke’s correspondence 
with van δimborch. The addition readsμ “But yet there is a case wherein a man is at liberty in 
respect of willing, and that is the choosing of a remote good as an end to be pursued” (E II, β1, 
η6). It is in clear contrast with what δocke originally wroteμ “A man in respect of that act of willing, 
is under a necessity, and so cannot be free” (ibid., βγ) Pierre Coste informed δeibniz on the cor-
respondence between δocke and van δimborch and the resulting additions and corrections to the 
Essay (see “δeibniz’s letter to Coste, 1λ December 1ι0ι”; GP III, ζ00 / AG, 1λγ).  
ηζ “βκ September 1ι0β”, CJδ VII, 6κ0. 
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Again, had δocke and δeibniz engaged in actual exchange of ideas, the out-
come of the correspondence with van δimborch might have been different. τn 
the other hand, although δeibniz’s metaphysical ideas might have been instru-
mental to ward off van δimborch’s challenge, δocke would have probably 
enquired whether they allow a form of compatibilism which involves a genu-
ine ability to do otherwise. For even if freedom of action is somewhat trivial 
as δeibniz appears to suggest, it is still, for δocke, a crucial requirement for 
freedom. In this regard, δocke would have been particularly concerned with 
δeibniz’s analytic theory of truth and complete concept theory of individual 
substances. 
The problem is that these theories seem to eliminate contingency and 
hence undermine freedomμ they suggest that in true propositions the predicate 
inheres in the subject, and this, in turn, appears to entail that all true proposi-
tions are necessary, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject without 
contradiction. δeibniz is clearly aware of the difficulties posed by these theo-
ries to his account of freedom.ηη His response, in brief, is that in necessary and 
contingent truths the predicate inheres in the subject in different manners.η6 
Inherence generally means that  
“the concept of the predicate is in some way involved in the concept of the sub-
ject” or that there is “some connection between subject and predicate.”ηι  
In necessary truths, it means that the predicate is actually contained in the 
content of the subject. Thus, an analysis of the terms of a necessary truth will 
yield identical propositions, that is to say, propositions displaying the (partial) 
identity between the subject and the predicate.ηκ In contingent truths, the pred-
icate is not literally contained in the subject. Rather, the content of the subject 
ηη See “τn Freedom”; A VI, ζ, 16ηζ / δ, β6γ f.; “Discourse on εetaphysics”, §1γ; A VI, ζ, 1ηζ6. 
η6 See “First Truths”; A VI, ζ, 16ζζ f. / δ, β6ι f. 
ηι “τn Freedom”; A VI, ζ, 16ηζ / δ, β6ζ; “τn Contingency”; A VI, ζ, 16η0 / AG, βκ. Italics 
added. See also “Remarks on Arnauld’s δetter”; A II, β, ζλ / δA, ζι; “δetter to Arnauld, 1ζ. 
July 16κ6”; A II, β, ιη, κ0 / δ, γγζ; γγι. 
ηκ See for example “General Inquiries about the Analysis of Concepts and of Truths” § 60; 
A VI, ζ, ιι6 / Pδ, 61; “General Inquiries”, § 1γγ; A VI, ζ, ιι6 / Pδ, ιι; “σecessary and Con-
tingent Truths”; A VI, ζ, 1η1η f. / PP, λ6 f.; “τn Contingency”; A VI, ζ, 16ζλ f. / AG, βκ; “τn 
Freedom”; A VI, ζ, 16ηη f. / δ, β6ζ f. The following are examples of analyses of necessary 
truths, resulting in identity propositions. An analysis of the proposition “a triangle is a polygon” 
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somehow implies that the predicate is appropriately attributed to the subject.ηλ 
Therefore, an analysis of the terms of a contingent truth cannot yield identical 
propositions. Such an analysis will result instead in “convergence”, as it were, 
to the conclusion that the predicate pertains to the subject, in a similar manner 
to convergence of the series 1, ½, ⅓, ¼ ... to 0, without 0 being included in the 
series.60 
Whether δeibniz’s clarification can satisfy δocke’s requirement for 
substantial meaning of ability to do otherwise remains an open question. Ad-
mittedly, the issue is much more complex than this brief answer on δeibniz’s 
behalf reveals. In particular, we did not go into the details of the complete 
concept theory of individual substances, which apart from its metaphysical 
eccentricity, seems to pose the gravest difficulties to the ability to do other-
wise.61 
4. Conclusion
In this paper we discussed δocke’s and δeibniz’s views regarding freedom 
and necessity and tried to conjecture how an actual discourse between them 
would have evolved. Indeed, a discussion between the two thinkers on these 
issues probably would have unfolded in diverse ways, not explored in this 
paper. σevertheless, the important point here is that examining δocke’s view 
will result in the identical proposition “a three-sided polygon is a polygon.” An analysis of the 
proposition “John’s mother is a woman” will result in the identical proposition “the woman 
who gave birth to John is a woman.”  
ηλ δeibniz illustrates the point by means of the example of Alexander the Great. By analyzing 
the concept of Alexander in order to establish contingent propositions regarding Alexander (e.g. 
that he will conquer Darius and Porus), one does not find in it the relevant predicates themselves 
(i.e. “conquering Darius and Porus”), but rather “the basis and the reason for all the predicates 
which can truly be affirmed of it” (“Discourse on εetaphysics”, § κ; A VI, ζ, 1ηζ0 f. / δ, γ0ι 
f.). See alsoμ “I mean no other link between subject and predicate than the one existing in the 
most contingent truths, namely that there is always something to be conceived in the subject 
which serves to explain why this predicate or event pertains to it, or why this has happened 
rather than not” (“Remarks on Arnauld’s δetter”; A II, β, ηβ / δA, η0). 
60 Seeμ “A true contingent proposition cannot be reduced to identical propositions, but is proved 
by showing that if the analysis is continued further and further, it constantly approaches identi-
cal propositions, but never reaches them” (“General Inquiries”, § 1γζ, A VI, ζ, ιι6 / Pδ, ιι, 
italics added). τnly God, being able to grasp the infinite, can see the convergence and know 
contingent truths with certainty. 
61 See δois Frankelμ “Being Able to do τtherwiseμ δeibniz on Freedom and Contingency,” inμ 
Roger S. Woolhouse (ed.)μ Leibniz. Critical Assessments, vol. IV, δondon 1λλζ, pp. βκζ–γ0β.  
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vis-à-vis δeibniz’s and conjecturing a hypothetical continuation of their dis-
cussion propose a deeper understanding of their positions and differences. 
Both share compatibilist view of freedom. Yet their definitions of freedom 
and their emphases are different. They also differ in their commitments to 
compatibilism. δocke did not hesitate to modify his view, when challenges 
suggested that it might undermine moral responsibility. δeibniz, by contrast, 
adhered to his compatibilism, since it was entrenched in deeper metaphysical 
doctrines. 
Appendix: Leibniz’s Classification of Aspects of Freedom 
freedom to will contrasted with the 
imperfection of the mind 
freedom to will contrasted 
with necessity 
freedom to act freedom to will 
freedom in fact freedom in law 
Freedom 
